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SEC Rule 10b-16: Should the Federal
Courts Allow Sophisticated Investors to
Recover?
In 1968, Congress passed the Truth In Lending Act' (TILA) to en-
sure adequate disclosure of credit requirements to consumers by mer-
chants and commercial lenders.' The TILA, however, specifically
exempted securities dealers from compliance.3 Instead, Congress gave
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the authority to adopt
a credit disclosure rule analogous to the TILA in order to regulate
the use of credit within the securities industry.4 In response to the
congressional mandate, the SEC enacted rule lOb-16 in 1969.1 Rule
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1982).
2. See Note, Securities Law-SEC Rule lOb-16-District of Columbia Circuit Limits Margin
Call Disclosure By Broker-Dealers-"Liang v. Dean Witter & Co.," 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1050
(1976); H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1962 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1040].
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 1603(2) (1982). The statute states in part: "This title [15 U.S.C.S.
§ 1601 et seq.] does not apply to the following: transactions in securities or commodities ac-
counts by a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission." Id. (brackets
in original).
4. S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT
392]. The Senate report stated:
The Committee [Senate Committee on Banking & Currency] has been informed
by the Securities and Exchange Commission that the Commission has adequate
regulatory authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require adequate
disclosure of the costs of such credit. The Committee has also been informed in
a letter from the SEC that "the Commission is prepared to adopt its own rules to
whatever extent may be necessary."
In recommending an exemption for stock-broker margin loans in the bill, the Com-
mittee intends for the SEC to require substantially similar disclosure by regulation
as soon as it is possible to issue such regulation.
Id.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1985). Rule lOb-16 provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer to extend credit, directly or in-
directly, to any customer in connection with any securities transaction unless such
broker or dealer has established procedures to assure that each customer:
(1) Is given or sent at the time of opening the account, a written statement or
statements disclosing (i) the conditions under which an interest charge will be impos-
ed; (ii) the annual rate or rates of interest that can be imposed; (iii) the method
of computing interest; (iv) if rates of interest are subject to change without prior
notice, the specific conditions under which they can be charged; (v) the method of
determining the debit balance or balances on which interest is to be charged and
whether credit is to be given for credit balances in cash accounts; (vi) what other
charges resulting from the extension of credit, if any, will be made and under what
conditions; and (vii) the nature of any interest or lien retained by the broker or dealer
in the security or other property held as collateral and the conditions under which
additional collateral can be required.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1985).
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lOb-16 effectively regulates the disclosure of credit terms, especially
in margin credit transactions.
6
The primary focus of rule lOb-16 is proper disclosure of credit terms
with respect to margin credit accounts.7 Failure of a securities firm
to disclose credit requirements or properly establish effective disclosure
procedures may result in an action by the SEC forcing compliance.'
Rule 10b-16, however, does not indicate whether a violation of the
rule will permit a private cause of action.9 Additionally, the SEC
Release' 0 that accompanied rule iOb-16 does not indicate whether
private individuals may bring an action based upon a violation by
a securities firm."
Historically, lower federal courts have allowed private individuals
to maintain a cause of action against securities firms based upon viola-
tions of numerous securities related statutes.' 2 These actions were
allowed despite the absence of a specific reference to a private cause
of action. 3 The United States Supreme Court, however, has adopted
a stricter test for implying private causes of action under SEC rules
and regulations." As a result, the lower federal courts conflict on
whether a private cause of action exists under rule 10b-16."5
This comment will address the issue of whether a private cause of
action under rule 1Ob-16 can be maintained, and whether such an
action would survive review by the Supreme Court in light of recent
6. Margin trading involves the purchase of securities or commodities on credit. In the
typical transaction, the investor finances a portion of the purchase price of the securities. The
broker then supplies the remaining funds in the form of a loan. The securities act as collateral
for the loan. See Note, SEC Rule 10b-16 and the Regulation of Margin Credit, 87 YALE L.J.
372, 372 n.5 (1977); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CoRPoRaAToNs § 296 n.12.
7. See Browning & Jackson, Brokers Beware! Private Cause of Action May Exist Under
Margin Account Disclosure Rules, 13 SEc. REG. L.J. 3, 4 (Fall 1985).
8. For example, the SEC may refuse to declare the registration of securities effective.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b) (1982). The SEC may also conduct hearings to determine if violations
have occurred or deny, suspend, or revoke the registration of broker-dealers. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b)(4) (1982). In addition, the SEC may turn over evidence of fraud or a willful violation
of a regulation or rule to the Department of Justice recommending that criminal prosecution
be initiated. See Schneider, Implying Private Rights and Remedies Under the Federal Securities
Acts, 62 N.C.L. REv. 853, 859 n.32 (1984).
9. See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
10. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-8773, 34 Fed. Reg. 19,717 (1969).
11. See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 24-58 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 24-58 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 24-58 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Liang v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc. 540 F.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(private cause of action under rule lOb-16 is assumed to be available); Establissment Toomis
v. Shearson Hayden Stone, 459 F. Supp. 1355, 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (no private cause of
action under rule lOb-16); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 540 (9th
Cir. 1984) (private cause of action allowed under rule lOb-16).
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Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions.' 6 The issue of
whether scienter should be an element of a cause of action under
rule 10b-16 will then be discussed.' 7 Finally, recent court decisions
within the securities area will be examined to determine whether the
courts should consider plaintiff's level of business sophistication before
permitting a private cause of action under rule l0b-16.18 This com-
ment will conclude that a private cause of action should be implied
under rule l0b-16,"9 and that, furthermore, rule lOb-16 will withstand
Supreme Court review.20 Considering the potential for abuse of the
securities laws by investors who trade on margin, scienter should be
required as an element of the implied cause of action.2 In conclu-
sion, this comment will argue that courts should examine the level
of sophistication of each particular plaintiff in deciding whether a
cause of action does indeed exist.22 A means by which the courts may
determine the level of sophistication necessary to deny recovery under
rule lOb-16 will be proposed.23 First, an examination of Supreme Court
cases will illustrate the availability of implied causes of action under
a number of securities laws.
IMPLIED PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER THE SECURITIES ACTS
In 1916, the Supreme Court in Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby2"
first recognized the ability of a private party to state a cause of action
under a federal statute that did not expressly provide a private
remedy.25 Within the securities area, the earliest lower court decisions
allowed a private cause of action to be implied based upon a tort
theory of recovery.26 In 1964, the Supreme Court in J. L Case Co.
16. See infra notes 24-128 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 129-49 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 150-219 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 113-28 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 113-28 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 129-49 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 150-219 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 220-28 and accompanying text.
24. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
25. The Court stated that failure to abide by a statute "is a wrongful act, and where
it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,
the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied. . . ." Id. at 39. See
Schneider, supra note 8, at 853 (discussion of Rigsby).
26. See Schneider, supra note 8, at 862. The courts reasoned that a party injured by a
violation of a statute that was enacted to protect an interest of the party could recover based
upon a statutorily imposed duty, notwithstanding the absence of an express private cause of
action. Id. See, e.g., Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) (im-
plied private cause of action under § 6(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1982)).
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v. Borak27 first upheld an implied private cause of action in the
securities area.28 The Court held that a corporate shareholder could
sue for damages resulting from a violation of section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) regulating the circulation
of proxy statements.29 In determining whether a private cause of action
could be implied under section 14(a), the Court examined the legislative
history to determine whether Congress intended to recognize a private
cause of action.3" The Court determined protection of investors was
a goal of section 14(a) and the statutory language implied the availabili-
ty of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result.,,
In Superintendent of Insurance v. Banker's Life and Casualty Co.,3 2
the Supreme Court recognized an implied private cause of action under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.33 Unfortunately, the Court did not in-
dicate how or when a private cause of action should be implied under
the federal statute.3 4 In a footnote, the Court simply stated that a
private cause of action is implied under section 10(b).1 The Court
did not provide a framework for analyzing whether a cause of action
could be implied from a federal statute until 1975, in Cort v. Ash. 6
27. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
28. Id. at 433-34.
29. Id. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982). Section
14(a) does not expressly provide for a private cause of action but does stipulate certain activities
as being unlawful. Section 14(a) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted
security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
30. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432.
31. Id. See Schneider, supra note 8, at 865. Justice Clark's majority opinion in Borak
did not apply the tort theory used by the lower federal courts at the time. Rather, the implica-
tion of a private cause of action was based primarily on legislative intent. See Schneider, supra
note 8, at 865.
32. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
33. Id. at 13. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (1982).
34. Superintendent of Insurance, 404 U.S. at 13.
35. Id. at 13 n.9. See Schneider, supra note 8, at 870.
36. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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In Cort, the Court promulgated a four-factor test for determining
whether Congress intended to allow a private cause of action to be
maintained.37 The Court stated that in situations in which federal law
clearly has granted certain rights to a particular class of citizens, ex-
press legislative intent to create a private cause of action need not
be shown. 3 Although the Supreme Court appears willing to imply
private causes of action under federal statutes when Cort is met, in
1977 the Court began to take a more restrictive view in this area.
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,9 the Supreme Court began to
limit the implication of private causes of action under federal statutes
which do not expressly provide a private remedy.40 The Court refus-
ed to interpret the Cort test to require a determination whether Con-
gress intended to allow private suits.4 ' Instead, the Court held the
correct interpretation was to determine whether an implied private
cause of action was necessary to achieve the goals determined by Con-
gress when the statute in question was enacted.42 Hence, an implied
private cause of action would be allowed only in circumstances in
which the goals of Congress could not be met without implying a
private cause of action. 43 Thus, the Court, in a holding limited to
the particular facts in Piper, refused to allow a private cause of ac-
tion to be implied under section 14(e) of the 1934 Act. 44
37. Id. at 78. The four factors promulgated by the Court in Cort are as follows:
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,
that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?. Second, is
there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such
a remedy or deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?. And finally, is the cause
of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern
of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely
on federal law?
Id. Interestingly, Cort did not involve a securities statute but § 610 of the 1948 Election Act,
which prohibited corporations from making contributions in connection with presidential elec-
tions. Id. at 68. See Schneider, supra note 8, at 873-74.
38. Cort, 422 U.S. at 82. The Court further stated that an explicit purpose to deny a
private cause of action would be controlling. Id. See Schneider, supra note 8, at 873-74.
39. 430 U.S. 1 (1975).
40. Id. at 24-46. See Block, Securities Litigation, 10 SEC. REo. L.J. 270, 271 (1982).
41. Piper, 430 U.S. at 26. See Schneider, supra note 8, at 880.
42. Piper, 430 U.S. at 26. See Schneider, supra note 8, at 880-81.
43. See Schneider, supra note 8, at 880-81.
44. Piper, 430 U.S. at 41. Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, as added by § 3 of the
Williams Act, 82 Stat. 457, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to
engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection
with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security
holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
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In 1979, the refusal of the Supreme Court to imply a private cause
of action continued in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington.4Y In Touche
Ross, the Court refused to allow a private cause of action under sec-
tion 17(a) of the 1934 Act.46 In a footnote, the Court cautioned against
an attempt to analogize the previously recognized implied private cause
of action under section 10(b) in Superintendent of Insurance to an
asserted right under section 17(a).47 The Court in Touche Ross stated
that, in recognizing an implied cause of action under section 10(b),
the Court was merely acquiescing to twenty-five years of lower federal
court decisions implying a private cause of action. 8 Section 17(a) did
not have a similar history. 9 Therefore, the Court did not recognize
an implied private cause of action." The Court continued to narrow
the availability of implied private causes of action under federal statutes
in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis."
In Transamerica, the Court allowed the implication of a private
cause of action under section 215 of the Investment Advisors Act
of 1940.52 This act makes contracts in which formation or perfor-
mance would violate the Act void as to the rights of the violator."
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). The Court in Piper determined that the sole purpose of § 14(e)
was to protect shareholders of target companies. See Piper, 430 U.S. at 35. Chris-Craft was
both a tender offeror and shareholder in Piper. Thus, the Court reasoned that even if a private
cause of action could be implied to shareholders of target companies, Chris-Craft could not
be considered a proper shareholder by virtue of its status as a defeated tender offeror and,
therefore, lacked standing. See id. at 42. See also Schneider, supra note 8, at 881 (discussion
of the limited holding of Piper). In conclusion, the Piper Court did not specifically preclude
the possibility of an implied private cause of action under § 14(3). The Court merely held
that in this specific fact pattern such a remedy was not available. See Piper, 430 U.S. at 42.
Specifically, the Court stated: "Our holding is a limited one. Whether shareholder-offerees,
the class protected by § 14(e), have an implied private cause of action under § 14(e) is not
before us, and we intimate no view on that matter. Nor is the target corporation's standing
to sue an issue in this case." Id. at 42 n.28. For a detailed discussion of the Piper decision
and the potential implications see Schneider, supra note 8, at 880-84.
45. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
46. Id. at 567. The Court reemphasized that "the fact that a federal statute has been
violated and some person harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action
in favor of that person." Id. at 568 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
688 (1979)).
47. Id. at 577 n.19. In the text, the Court stated in reference to the decision in Borak
allowing for an implied private cause of action under § 14(a) "[wie do not now question the
actual holding of that case, but we decline to read the opinion so broadly that virtually every
provision of the Securities Acts gives rise to an implied private cause of action." Id. at 577.
48. Id. at 577 n.19 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690-93, n.13).
49. Id. at 577-78, n.19.
50. Id. at 578.
51. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
52. Id. at 19.
53. Section 215 provides in part as follows:
(b) Every contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter and every
contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the viola-
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The Court, however, refused to allow the implication of a private
cause of action under section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act
of 1940,14 which prohibits fraudulent practice by investment advisors."
The language used in section 206 is very similar to that used in sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act.56 Thus, the Court has refused to allow
a private cause of action under a statute very similar to a statute
for which a private cause of action was implied eight years earlier."
This leads to the conclusion that implication of private causes of ac-
tion under statutory provisions similar to section 10(b) and section
206 may not withstand Supreme Court review absent a long history
of lower court decisions acquiescing in the implication of a private
cause of action. In light of the stricter standard of review employed
by the Supreme Court in allowing private causes of action under federal
statutes, the lower federal courts have struggled since 1976 with the
question whether a private cause of action may be implied under rule
lOb-16. ss Prior to a discussion of applicable case law, a discussion
of the legislative history of rule lOb-16 will be presented.
tion of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of any provi-
sion of this subchapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, shall be void
(1) as regards to rights of any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule,
regulation, or order, shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such
contract and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a party to such
contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts
by reason of which the making or performance of such contract was in violation
of any such provision.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1982).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982). Section 206 provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-(l) to employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client, (2) to engage
in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit
upon any client or prospective client; (3) acting as principal for his own account,
knowingly to sell any security to or purchase any security from a client, or acting
as broker for a person other than such client, knowingly to effect any sale or pur-
chase of any security for the account of such client without disclosing to such client
in writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting
and obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this
paragraph shall not apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer
if such broker or dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such
transaction; (4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this paragraph
(4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to pre-
vent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative.
Id.
55. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 25.
56. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 806-g (1982) (Rule 206) with 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (section
10(b)). See supra notes 33 (text of § 10(b)) and 54 (text of Rule 206).
57. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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RULE lOb-16
A. Legislative Intent
The United States Supreme Court places emphasis upon legislative
intent and purpose when interpreting statutory enactments.5 9 Therefore,
the determination of the legislative intent behind rule lOb-16 is critical
in analyzing whether a private cause of action can be implied. Un-
fortunately, when Congress passed the TILA and authorized the SEC
to promulgate a similar rule for the securities industry, no guidance
was given regarding whether the rule should be identical to the TILA. 60
Since the TILA primarily concerns the protection of financially un-
sophisticated consumers,' a question remains whether the SEC was
expected to develop a rule to protect similar unsophisticated investors
in the specialized and sophisticated field of trading on margin credit.
In Senate hearings, the drafters of the TILA stated that margin traders
were sophisticated investors who did not need statutory protection.62
The Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the House Committee on
Banking and Currency decided to allow the SEC to promulgate a rule
governing margin trading. The Committee, however, failed to discuss
the type of investors that should be afforded protection under the
rule.63
SEC Release No. 34-8777,64 which accompanied the inception of
rule lOb-16, stressed that the function of rule lOb-16 was to require
disclosure. 6" The release emphasized that the disclosure should facilitate
59. See supra notes 24-58 and accompanying text.
60. See SENATE REPORT 392, supra note 4. See also Note, supra note 6, at 375 (discussion
of the lack of clear legislative intent with respect to rule lOb-16); Consumer Credit Protection
Act Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 11601 Hear-
ings] (congressional discussion of the TILA and the promulgation by the SEC of a similar rule).
61. See Note, supra note 6, at 375. The primary concern of the TILA for unsophisticated
investors may be implied from the types of transactions that are not covered within the TILA.
Ii. The TILA does not apply to extensions of credit for business or commercial purposes in
excess of $25,000 or for transactions in commodities or securities. Id. at 374. See H.R. 11601
Hearings, supra note 60, at 677 (Senator Proxmire testifying that credit transactions in excess
of $25,000 involved parties having the financial sophistication to bargain for any requisite
disclosure).
62. See H.R. 11601 Hearings, supra note 60, at 677; see also Note, supra note 6, at 375
(discussion of H.R. 11601 Hearings).
63. See H.R. 11601 Hearings, supra notes 60, at 677.
64. 34 Fed. Reg. 19,717 (1969).
65. See id. The Release states in relevant part:
The Rule requires an initial disclosure and periodic disclosures. The initial disclosure
is designed to insure that the investor, before his account is opened, understands
the terms and conditions under which credit charges will be made. This will enable
him to compare the various credit terms available to him and to understand the methods
used in computing the actual credit charges. The periodic statement will inform the
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investor understanding of credit terms and accurate assessment of credit
costs." This language is very similar to that in the stated purpose
of the TILA. 67 Unlike the TILA, however, rule lOb-16 does not pro-
vide expressly for a private cause of action.6 Thus, in assessing whether
a private cause of action should be implied under rule 10b-16, the
legislative history surrounding both the TILA and rule lOb-16 pro-
vides little guidance in determining actual legislative intent as required
in Cort and Transamerica.69 Although the legislative intent surrounding
rule lOb-16 is unclear, the lower federal courts nonetheless have at-
tempted to fashion a cogent analysis of whether a private cause of
action should be implied under rule lOb-16.
B. Federal Court Decisions
1. Liang and Establissment Toomis-The Beginning of a
Controversy
In Liang v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc.,70 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia was presented with the first occa-
sion to discuss the possibility of implying a private cause of action
under rule lOb-16. 7' In Liang, the plaintiffs opened a margin account
with Dean Witter & Co. 72 At the time of opening, plaintiffs signed
a Customers Agreement form and within a short time signed a Credit
Charges form.71 One year later, Dean Witter & Co. wrote to plain-
tiffs requesting an additional $2,600 as collateral, since plaintiffs'
investor of the actual cost'of credit and, with the aid of the initial disclosure, enable
him to accurately assess that cost.
Id.
66. Id.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970). The preamble of the TILA originally read as follows:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competi-
tion among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the exten-
sion of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit. The
informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers.
It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms
so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
Id. See also Note, supra note 2, at 1059 (discussing how language in SEC Release No. 34-8773
is similar to the purpose of the TILA).
68. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982) (elements of the TILA providing for a private
cause of action) with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1985) (elements of rule lOb-16 which do not
provide for a private cause of action).
69. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
70. 540 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
71. Id. at 1109.
72. Id.
73. Id. The Customers Agreement provided in part as follows:
You are hereby authorized, in your discretion, should the undersigned die or should
you for any reason whatsoever deem it necessary for your protection, to sell any
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securities margin was not sufficient at the current price.74 Plaintiffs
did not meet the margin call7" and the securities were sold. 76
Plaintiffs argued that the Customers Agreement and Credit Charges
forms supplied by Dean Witter & Co. did not comply with rule
lOb-16(a)(1)(vii)." The Liang court discussed the general history of
rule lOb-16 and concluded that failure to properly disclose the possi-
ble requirement of additional collateral would constitute a violation
of rule lOb-16.78 The court addressed the crucial issue regarding an
implied private cause of action in a footnote. 79 The Liang court
"assumed" that since rule lOb-16 was somewhat similar to section
10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5, a private cause of action should
be implied under rule lOb-16. s°
Two years later, in 1978, the United States District Court for the
District of New York in Establissment Toomis v. Shearson Hayden
or all of the securities and commodities or other property which may be in your
possession or which you may be carrying for the undersigned. . . . Such sale . .
• may be made according to your judgment and may be made, at your discretion
. . . without advertising the same and without notice to the undersigned.
Id. The Credit Charges form read in pertinant part as follows:
5. LIENS AND COLLATERAL-As provided in our Customer's Agreement, we
have a general lien upon all securities which we hold for you for the discharge of
all your obligations to us,, however arising and irrespective of the number of accounts
you maintain, We may at any time require you to deposit cash or such additional




75. When the amount of an investor's collateral declines through a reduction in stock
price, the broker-dealer will require the investor to supply additional funds. This process is
typically referred to as a margin call. See Note, supra note 2, at 378 n.28.
76. Liang, 540 F.2d at 1109-10.
77. Id. at 1110. Rule IOb-16(a)(1)(vii) states in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer to extend credit, directly or in-
directly, to any customer in connection with any securities transaction unless such
broker or dealer has established procedures to assure that each customer:
(1) is given or sent at the time of opening an account, a written statement or
statements diclosing ... (vii) the nature of any interest or lien retained by the broker
or dealer in the security or other property held as collateral and the conditions under
which additional collateral can be required ...
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1985).
78. Liang, 540 F.2d at 1111-12.
79. Id. at 1113 n.25.
80. Id. Rule lOb-5, promulgated under § 10(b) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as fraud or deceit upon any person, in the connection with the purchase
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Stone, Inc.,"1 rejected the possibility of an implied private cause of
action under rule 10b-16.12 The basis for rejecting the plaintiff's argu-
ment for an implied cause of action was that the court was "unaware"
of any case that specifically allowed such a claim.13 Thus, the court
assumed that a private cause of action under rule 10b-16 could not
be implied." Since the decision in Establissment Toomis, only one
lower federal court has denied a private cause of action under rule
lOb-16. s5
The majority of lower federal courts have recognized an implied
private cause of action under rule 10b-16.' Although the majority
of courts have implied a private cause of action under rule 10b-16,
the courts have split regarding the proper method of analysis to allow
the action. 7 Since the establishment of the correct method of analysis
ultimately may affect whether the Supreme Court will allow a private
cause of action to be implied under rule lOb-16, two competing
methods will be discussed.
2. The Correct Method of Analysis-TILA Versus Section
10(b)
The lower federal courts have not been consistent in the method
employed to determine if a private cause of action may be implied
or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
81. 459 F. Supp. 1355 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
82. Id. at 1361.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. See Furer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &-Curtis, Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 98,701 (C.D. Cal. 1982). The Furer court stated with respect to allowing a
private cause of action under Rule lOb-16 "[t]he creation of such a private remedy would
open a potentially large new area for litigation. In the absence of a clear and unambiguous
showing that Congress intended such a result, the Court declines to find a private right of
action implied in the Rule." Id. The continued viability of the reasoning in Furer is in doubt,
however, considering the Robertson decision in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which held
that a private cause of action may be implied under rule 1Ob-16. See infra notes 101-12 and
accompanying text.
86. See Angelastro v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 950 (3rd Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 267 (1985); Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d
1352, 1358 n.8 (lth Cir. 1985) (the court did not specifically address the issue of whether
a private cause of action could be implied, but assumed arguendo that such a cause of action
could exist); Granville Market Letter v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 923, 923 (D.
Fla. 1985); Abeles v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 532, 536 (N.D. I11. 1983); Haynes
v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303, 1321 (E.D. Va. 1981); Stephens v. Reynolds
Securities, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 50, 52 (N.D. Ala. 1976) (court did not specifically state whether
private cause of action under rule lOb-16 could be implied, but allowed recovery under the
rule); Torn v. Rosen, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,603, 99,070 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 3, 1984); Slomiak v. Bear Sterns & Co., Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 91, 590, 99,026 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1984).
87. See infra notes 88-112 and accompanying text.
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under rule lOb-16. s8 The Liang court did not address directly why
rule lOb-16 may give rise to a private cause of action. The court
discussed both the TILA and rule lOb-5, the antifraud statute, con-
cluded rule 10b-16 was similar to both. 9 The Liang court stated,
however, that since a private cause of action is permited under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5, a private cause of action "should" exist
under rule lOb-16. 90 The court, however, failed to state any supporting
rationale.9 Thus, the first federal court to address the issue of a private
cause of action under rule lOb-16 failed to state a reason why a private
cause of action could be implied.
92
The court in Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick93 was the first to
specifically discuss whether a cause of action could be implied under
rule lOb-16. The Haynes court reasoned that rule lOb-16 was pro-
mulgated as the analogue of the TILA in federal securities law. 94
Therefore, the court considered whether Congress created a private
cause of action under the TILA to determine if a similar cause of
action should exist under rule 10b-16.95 Since the TILA reveals that
Congress created an express cause of action for customers when lenders
fail to comply with the TILA, the Haynes court concluded that a
private cause of action did in fact exist under rule lOb-16.96 Surpris-
ingly, the method of analysis followed by the court in Haynes has
found supportoin Furer v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,"
which held that a private cause of action did not exist under rule
10b-16. 91 The Furer court reasoned that brokers were exempted from
the TILA because Congress did not want a private cause of action
88. See, e.g., Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534-37 (private cause of action based on § 10(b)
and rule 10b-5); Haynes, 508 F. Supp. at 1320-21 (private cause of action based on the TILA).
89. Liang, 540 F.2d at 1110-11.
90. Id. at 1113 n.25.
91. Id.
92. Id. Specifically, the Liang court stated "[i]t may safely be assumed that noncompliance
with Rule 10b-16 provides the basis for a private cause of action." Id.
93. 508 F. Supp. 1303 (1981).
94. Id. at 1320.
95. Id. Prior to this determination, the Haynes court acknowledged that the Cori factors
should be considered in deciding whether to imply a private cause of action. Id. at 1319. In
addition, the Haynes court recognized the Cori factors were refined in Transamerica so that
"what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy
asserted." Id. at 1319 (citing Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 15).
96. Haynes, 508 F. Supp. at 1320-21. The Haynes court further supported this conclusion
by noting that rule lOb-16 was promulgated under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and felt that the
court would be inconsistent if a private cause of action were permitted under rule lob-5 and
not under rule 10b-16. Id. Although the court in Haynes does mention § 10(b), the major
emphasis of the decision is on the TILA with the § 10(b) analysis only providing additional
support for the decision. Id.
97. [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,701 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
98. Id. at 93,495.
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under the TILA to apply to brokers. 99 The majority of courts, however,
have based a finding of an implied private cause of action under rule
lOb-16 on section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 0 0
The recent decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Robert-
son v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.III details the analysis under sec-
tion 10(b) employed by the majority of lower federal courts. 0 2 The
Robertson court reasoned that both Congress and the SEC recognized
that the authority of the SEC to promulgate the margin trading regula-
tion of credit came from section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and not the
TILA.'0 3 Thus, the court decided not to rely upon the legislative history
of the TILA.'0 4 Rather, the court stated the underlying statute from
which a private cause of action must be implied is section 10(b).
0 5
Since the existence of an implied private cause of action under sec-
tion 10(b) was well established, 06 and the proper statute to apply was
section 10(b), the Robertson court then determined that the implied
private cause of action under section 10(b) may be implied into rule
lOb-16.
°0 7
The Robertson court recognized statutory interpretation should focus
on legislative intent to find an implied private cause of action under
a federal statute. 08 Moreover, the court recognized that a private cause
99. Id. The Furer court stated:
Thus, the Haynes court construed the exemption of brokers from the Truth in Lending
Act as an expression of Congressional expectation that the SEC would promulgate
regulations authorizing a private right to action. This is one possible construction,
but it is not the only one. It is equally plausible that Congress exempted brokers
from the Truth in Lending Act because it did not wish to extend the private right
of action extended therein to apply to brokers.
Id.
100. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
101. 749 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1984).
102. Id. at 535-37.
103. Id. at 535. This conclusion was based on the language in Senate Report 392 which
states: "[t]he Committee has been informed by the Securities and Exchange Commission that
the Commission has adequate regulatory authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
to require adequate disclosure of the costs of such credit .... " Id. at 535 (citing S. REP.
No. 392, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1967)).
104. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 535.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 730 (1975); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
107. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 536. The court stated that since rule lOb-16 is "reasonably"
related to § 10(b) "we find no justification for a departure from the general principle that
the rulemaking power of an administrative agency is limited to implementation of statutory
purposes." Id.
108. Id. See supra notes 24-58 and accompanying text. In examining statutory construction
to find an implied cause of action under a statute, the implied remedy will also be read into
the accompanying administrative rule. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 536 (citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
at 213-14).
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of action under section 10(b) was implied on the basis of long-standing
judicial construction, rather than upon the basis of traditional con-
gressional intent analysis.'0 9 Notwithstanding the lack of a long-standing
judicial acquiescence to an implied private cause of action under rule
lOb-16, the Robertson court held that rule lOb-16 was sufficiently
"reasonably related" to section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 to allow a private
cause of action to be implied."' The decision of the Robertson court
illustrates the view in the majority of lower federal courts that a private
cause of action should be implied under rule lOb-16 through a sec-
tion 10(b) analysis."' In light of the narrowing trend in recent Supreme
Court cases involving implied private causes of action under the
securities laws,"' however, a strong possibility exists that the Supreme
Court will not allow a private cause of action to be implied under
rule lOb-16.
C. The Impact of Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Considering most courts have implied a private cause of action under
rule 10b-16 through a section 10(b) analysis," ' the recent Supreme
Court trend to limit implied private causes of action may jeopardize
the continued viability of lower court decisions involving rule lOb-16.'"
For example, the Supreme Court decision in Transamerica did not
allow a private cause of action under section 206 of the Investment
Advisors Act, a statute similar to section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5.'t5 This
109. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 536.
110. Id. at 539. In support, the court cited from an amicus brief filed by the SEC at the
request of the court in Liang which states in part:
We do not know whether Dean Witter's disclosure in this case, under all circumstances,
was entirely appropriate. We believe however, that the plaintiff should be given an
opportunity to establish whether the disclosure by Dean Witter in this case complied
with the requirements of Rule 10b-16, and that Dean Witter should be given an op-
portunity to adduce such facts as may demonstrate that it either (a) did not violate
Rule 1Ob-16; or (b) should not be assessed any damages, under the circumstances
of this case.
Id. at 538 (citing Liang, 540 F.2d at 1112 n.22, amicus brief at 9-10). In addition, the Robert-
son court determined that although rule 10b-16 is, in effect, a rule of disclosure, the rule is
nonetheless reasonably related to the anti-fraud purposes of § 10(b) and, therefore, should
enjoy the availability of an implied private cause of action. Id. at 538.
111. See, e.g., Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 949; Greenblatt, 763 F.2d at 1358 n.8; Ables, 597
F. Supp. at 536; Torn, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91, 603, at 99,070;
Slomiak, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 191,590, at 99,026.
112. See supra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 24-58 and accompanying text; see also Block, supra note 40, at 271.
115. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 24-25. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
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refusal supports the proposition that the Court may not allow an im-
plied private cause of action under rule lOb-16." 6
The most significant factor in the possible demise of an implied
private cause of action under rule lOb-16 is the lack of any clear
legislative intent.' 7 A Cort or Transamerica analysis, which many of
the lower courts have applied to find implied private causes of action
under other securities laws, may not survive Superme Court review
when applied to rule lOb-16." 8 In addition, rule lOb-16 does not have
the long history of lower federal court decisions favoring an implied
private cause of action which was the most important factor in the
eventual acquiescence by the Supreme Court of an implied private
cause of action under section 10(b)."19 In essence, the steadfast reliance
of the lower federal courts on section 10(b) for implying a private
cause of action under rule lOb-16 ultimately may prove fatal. 2 '
The four courts that specifically discussed the issue of an implied
private cause of action under rule lOb-16, however, agreed that a
private cause of action does exist.' 2' In addition, in the most recent
Supreme Court section 10(b) case of Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston,12 the Court stated that the existence of an implied private
116. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 24-112 and accompanying text. The Robertson court, however, stated
that since Rule lOb-16 was not enacted by Congress, but rather by the SEC acting on authority
delegated by Congress, the proper two-step inquiry is: "(1) whether Congress delegated authority
to establish rules implying a private right of action and (2) whether the rule in question was
drafted such that this private right of action may legitimately be implied." Robertson, 749
F.2d at 534 (citing Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir. 1980)). The
use of the Jablon test by the Robertson court was apparently in response to the clear lack
of legislative intent behind Rule lOb-16 and the possible inapplicability of a Cort type test.
Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534-35. However, all other federal courts have based an implied private
cause of action under rule lOb-16 on an analysis of legislative intent through either the Cort
test directly or through Transamerica. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. In Transamerica,
the Cort test was narrowed to a focused inquiry on the question of congressional intent, either
implicit or explcit, as evidenced by the language of the statute, contemporary context of the
enactment of the statute, legislative history, and the place of the statute in the overall enforce-
ment scheme. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 23-24.
119. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court acquiesced to over 25
years of lower federal court decisions in implying a § 10(b) private cause of action. See Touche
Ross, 442 U.S. at 577 n.19 (explaining that the Supreme Court in Transamerica allowed a
private cause of action under § 10(b) primarily because of the 25-year history of lower federal
courts accepting the implication of such a cause of action). Rule 10b-16 has only a ten year
history of acquiescence which may not be sufficient for the Supreme Court to agree to an
implied private cause of action. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
121. See Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 950; Robertson, 749 F.2d at 536; Greenblatt, 763 F.2d
at 1358 n.8 (assuming arguendo that a private cause of action may be implied); Stephens, 413
F. Supp. at 52.
122. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
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cause of action under section 10(b) is "simply beyond peradventure."'' 3
A strong argument exists that rule lOb-16 is essentially an extension
of section 10(b).'12  Thus, although some very strong arguments may
be presented in support of the eventual demise of the implication of
a private cause of action under rule lOb-16, the concurrence among
all circuit courts' 25 and most district courts' 26 that a private cause
of action should be implied under rule 10b-16 indicates that a private
cause of action under rule lOb-16 would survive a review by the
Supreme Court.
Although the Supreme Court will most likely recognize an implied
private cause of action under rule lOb-16 because of the similarity
of the rule to section 10(b), the elements of a rule lOb-16 cause of
action are not clear.' 27 Many of the lower federal courts that have
addressed the use of rule lOb-16 in a private action either have not
mentioned the necessary elements of such an action or are in disagree-
ment with respect to the necessary elements.' 8 Specifically, the courts
are unclear regarding whether scienter should be included as an ele-
ment of a rule 10b-16 cause of action.
THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,'29 the United States Supreme Court
concluded that a plaintiff could not maintain a private cause of action
for damages under section 10(b) or rule lOb-5 without alleging
scienter. 30 The Court concluded that rule 10b-5 was adopted under
the authority granted to the SEC under section 10(b). 13' Therefore,
the scope of rule lOb-5 cannot exceed the power granted to the SEC
by Congress under section 10(b).'32 The intent of Congress in drafting
section 10(b) was to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct. 33
123. Id. at 380; see also supra note 106 and accompanying text (existence of an implied
private cause of action under § 10(b) is well established).
124. See supra notes 88-112 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
127. See Note, supra note 2, at 1066-76 (discussion of the elements of a rule 10b-16 private
cause of action including scienter, reliance, materiality, and causation).
128. See, e.g., Robertson, 748 F.2d at 539-41 (in depth discussion of scienter resulting in
the conclusion that scienter is a requirement); Haynes, 508 F. Supp. at 1321 (in depth discus-
sion of scienter resulting in the conclusion that scienter is not a requirement); Abeles, 597
F. Supp. 532 (no discussion of scienter or any other element of a rule lOb-16 cause of action).
129. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
130. Id. at 193. Scienter is defined as the "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
Id. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS, § 107 (5th ed. 1984).
131. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199.
132. Id. at 214.
133. Id. at 197.
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Thus, a suit under rule 10b-5 was considered defective if the plaintiff
failed to prove scienter.' 34
Liang was the first court to consider whether scienter should be
a required element in an action based upon a violation of rule
10b-16.13S The Liang court recognized that scienter was a necessary
element for recovery under a rule lOb-5 action.'3 6 The court, however,
failed to address the issue directly and remanded the case without
a final decision about a rule lOb-16 requirement for scienter.
137
In Haynes, decided five years after Liang, the issue of whether to
include the requirement of scienter in a rule lOb-16 action was
addressed specifically. 13 The Haynes court stated that although scienter
was a necessary element of a section 10(b) or rule lOb-5 cause of
action, scienter was not an element of a private action implied under
the TILA. 39 The Haynes court concluded that a requirement of scienter
for a rule lOb-16 cause of action would be "foreign" to the plain
language of rule lOb-16, since the rule is mechanical in nature and
should be read consistently with the TILA.'4 0 While recognizing the
decision was inconsistent with the requirements of a section 10(b) or
rule lOb-5 claim, the Haynes court ruled that scienter nevertheless
should not be an element of an implied cause of action under rule
lOb-16.' 41
Conversely, in 1984, the court in Robertson found that scienter
should be a required element of a rule lOb-16 implied private cause
of action.' 42 The Robertson court ostensibly relied on the conclusion
made by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder that the claimant must
prove scienter in a section 10(b) or rule lOb-5 cause of action.'4 3 Since
the court in Robertson concluded that an implied private cause of
134. Id. at 193. See Note, supra note 2, at 1067. The elements of reliance, materiality,
and causation are not expressly rooted in the language of § 10(b). Nonetheless, courts have
required proof of these elements in rule lOb-5 litigation. See Note, supra note 2, at 1069-70.
A discussion of these elements, however, is beyond the scope of this comment.
135. Liang, 540 F.2d at 1113 n.25.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Haynes, 508 F. Supp. at 1321.
139. Id. Negligent noncompliance with the TILA is actionable. Id. Failure to comply with
the Act does not have to be knowing or intentional. Id. at 1321 n.12. In addition, the TILA
does provide that a bona fide unintentional error is a defense from civil liability. Id. See 15
U.S.C. § 1640 (1982).
140. Haynes, 508 F. Supp. at 1321.
141. Id. The conclusion reached by the Haynes court is not surprising considering the court
had determined that the proper method of analyzing whether a private cause of action should
be implied under rule lOb-16 was through the TILA. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying
text.
142. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 539-41.
143. Id. at 540. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
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action could be maintained under rule lOb-16 through section 10(b),
scienter should be a required element of a cause of action under rule
10b-16 as well."' Since the Robertson decision, only one other court
has specifically discussed the possibility of a scienter requirement under
rule 10b-16. '41 That court concluded, without discussion, that such
a requirement did exist.'
6
The possibility of a scienter requirement under rule lOb-16 has been
specifically addressed by only three courts.'4 7 Since the great majority
of lower federal courts have based an implied private cause of action
under rule 10b-16 on the language of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,
a strong presumption exists that s6ienter will be required in the
future.'48 Considering the strong legislative intent to limit section 10(b),
and presumably rule 10b-16, another logical limitation should be a
review of the level of sophistication of each particular rule 10b-16
plaintiff. 
49
A VIEw TowARD TEi PLAINTIFF
Most causes of action under rule 10b-16 are precipitated by plain-
tiff's failure to meet a required margin call. 50 Once the margin call
is not met, the broker-dealer sells the securities being held as col-
lateral.'' This sale usually results in a considerable loss to the in-
vestor." 2 The investor then alleges that proper disclosure was not made
144. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 540. The court rejected the lower standard of proof required
under the TILA since the court felt that the TILA had absolutely no application to a rule
lOb-16 analysis. Id.
145. See Granville Market Letter, 610 F. Supp. at 922.
146. See id. The court noted that failure of a plaintiff to plead and prove scienter resulted
in a summary judgment against the plaintiff. Id.
147. See supra notes 135-46 and accompanying text (discussion of Liang, Haynes, and
Robertson).
148. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text (discussion of scienter requirement under
§ 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5).
149. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 2, at 1067-70
(discussion of scienter requirement under rule 1Ob-16).
150. See, e.g., Robertson, 749 F.2d at 533 (failure to meet a margin call of $7,100); Slomiak,
[1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 91,590, at 99,023 (failure to meet margin
call of $155,000). In addition, suits have been brought under rule lOb-16 for failure to provide
any disclosure. See, e.g., Haynes, 508 F. Supp. at 1308. Courts have required that a plaintiff
who brings an action under § 10(b) must be a purchaser or seller of securities. See Blue Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731-32. Considering the language of rule 10b-16, a similar requirement
must be met before a plaintiff can bring an action under rule lOb-16. See Note, supra note
6, at 388.
151. See Note, supra note 6, at 378 n.28.
152. See, e.g., Robertson, 749 F.2d at 533 (failure to meet margin call resulted in loss
of $149,000); Slomaik, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 91,590, at 99,023
(failure to meet requisite margin call and subsequent liquidation of securities by broker-dealer
resulted in a loss of $256,285).
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under rule lOb-16 and seeks to recover the loss.' 5 3 Many courts have
recognized potential for abuse and have stressed that the securities
laws should not be a system of investors' insurance.'54 Justice Friendly
in his dissenting opinion in Pearlstein v. Scudder & German'5 (Pearl-
stein 1), in which the majority held that a private cause of action
may be implied under section 7(c) of the 1934 Act,'16 stated that:
As a result of it [section 7(c)], speculators will be in a position to
place all the risk of market fluctuations on their brokers . . . any
deterrent effect of the threatened liability on the broker may well
be more than offset by the inducement to violations inherent in the
prospect of a free ride for the customer who, under the majority's
view, is placed in the enviable position of "heads-I-win, tails-you-
lose."
57
The requirement that a plaintiff prove scienter under section 10(b),
rule lOb-5, and arguably rule lOb-16, poses a significant obstacle to
obtaining a recovery.' s8 Notwithstanding the difficulty in proving
scienter, the.potential for abuse of the securities laws by investors
has led many courts to limit the possibility of recovery even more
by examining the specific plaintiff's level of sophisticiation.'I"
153. Essentially, the failure to comply with Rule 1Ob-16 may allow a margin account customer
a put on the transactions which are carried on within the margin account. See Browning, supra
note 7, at 3. A put is defined as an option to sell. See J. FRANCIS, INVESTMENTS: ANALYSIS
AND MANAGEMENT 405 (3rd ed. 1980).
154. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); see
also Note, supra note 6, at 390 n.65.
155. 429 F.2d 1136 (2nd Cir. 1970).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1982).
157. Pearlstein, 429 F.2d at 1148 (Friendly, J., dissenting). Justice Friendly's dissenting opinion
became the majority view when Pearlstein was decided by the Second Circuit for a second
time. The court stated:
We note that in our prior opinion in this case, emphasis was placed on the fact
that "the federally imposed margin requirements forbid a broker to extend undue
credit but do not forbid customers from accepting such credit." (citations omitted).
However, the addition of section 7(f) to the Exchange Act in 1970, 15 U.S.C. §
78g(f), as well as the promulgation by the Federal Reserve Board of Regulation X,
12 C.F.R. § 224 (1975), have now made it unlawful to obtain credit in violation
of the margin requirements. The effect of these developments is to cast doubt on
the continued viability of the rationale of our prior holding.
Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 527 F.2d 1141, 1145 n.3 (2nd Cir. 1975) (emphasis by the court).
158. Proof of scienter demands an inquiry into the defendant's state of mind. See Note,
supra note 2, at 1068-69. Thus, in a Rule 10b-16 action, the plaintiff must prove that a broker
who made inadequate disclosure under rule lOb-16 knew that the failure to make disclosure
to the customer would mislead the customer as to the broker's policy with respect to margin
accounts. See id. Although the determination of a plaintiffs state of mind is a formidable
task, most courts have allowed the defendant's mental state to be inferred from the surround-
ing circumstances. Id. at 1068.
159. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). In determining whether
employees should be protected by means of full disclosure under registration requirements of
the 1934 Act, the court looked to the particular plaintiffs to determine if they had knowledge
and sophistication sufficient that disclosure was not required. Id. at 126.
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Historically, the level of sophistication of plaintiff investors has been
a component of several securities laws.' 60 This willingness to examine
the level of sophistication of the plaintiff by the courts has affected
at least one decision within the rule lOb-16 area.
A. The Zerman v. Ball Decision
In Zerman v. Ball,'6' plaintiff brought an action for damages against
a broker-dealer based upon a violation of a number of securities laws,
including rule lOb-16.' 62 The plaintiff, Zerman, purchased a $100,000
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) certificate for
$104,000 on margin. 61 Plaintiff also purchased an additional $10,000
160. For example, SEC rule 146 contained objective guidelines providing for a private offering
exemption from registration to be applicable if the offer involves "(3) purchasers whom the
issuer reasonably believes to be sophisticated and financially able to bear the risk of invest-
ment. .... " 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1974). Rule 146 has since been replaced by Regulation D
which consists of six rules including rule 506 which states in relevant part:
The issuer shall reasonably believe immediately prior to making any sale that each
purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or with his purchaser represen-
tative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that
he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment.
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1985). Thus, if an investor is not deemed either accredited or
knowledgeable, a corporation may not issue securities without formal registration with the SEC.
The term accredited investor is defined in part as:
(d) any director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the securities
being offered or sold, or any director, executive officer, or general partner of that
issuer;
(e) any person who purchases at least $150,000 of the securities being offered,
where the purchaser's total purchase price does not exceed 20 percent of the pur-
chaser's net worth at the time of sale, or joint net worth with the person's spouse,
for one or any. combination of the following: (1) cash, (2) securities for which market
quotations are readily available, (3) an unconditional obligation to pay cash or securities
for which market quotations are readily available which obligation is to be discharged
within five years of the sale of the securities to the purchaser, or (4) the cancellation
of any indebtedness owed by the issuer to the purchaser;
(f) Any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that
person's spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000;
(g) Any natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in
each of the two most recent years and who reasonably expects an income in excess
of $200,000 in the current year. .. .
17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (1985). Although the term "sophisticated" has been removed since the
adoption of Rule 506, the implication, nonetheless, is that protection in the form of formal
registration requirements with the SEC will be afforded to only those investors who are not
well versed in financial matters. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982) (private offering
exemption).
161. 735 F.2d 15 (1984).
162. The plaintiff contended that the defendants violated the following: §§ 7, 10, 15, 20,
and 29 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, 78j, 78o, 78t, 78cc (1982)),
and Rules 10b-5, 10b-16 (17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.10b-16 (1983)); §§ 12(2) and 17 of the
Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. §§ 771(s), 77q (1982)); New York Stock Exchange Rules
401 and 405; National Association of Securities Dealers Rules of Fair Practice, Article Ill,
§ 2; and various provisions of Florida law. Id. at 17.
163. Id. at 18.
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worth of bonds in cash.' 6 4 The plaintiff sold the bonds for $8,300
and sold the GNMA certificate for $79,208.05.165 In the complaint,
plaintiff alleged the defendants knowingly made various false represen-
tations and omissions that were relied upon by plaintiff in making
the investment decisions. 6 1 Plaintiff stated in the complaint "[d]efen-
dants failed to apprise Zerman of the nature of a margin account
and of the prospect that she might be called upon to provide more
funds if the market fell. .... -167 Without deciding whether the plain-
tiff could recover under rule lOb-16 based upon an implied private
cause of action, the Zerman court summarily dismissed the claim.
6
1
The court held that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.' 619 The court concluded that no violation of any
securities law exists for failure to disclose information known to anyone
with even a cursory knowledge of the securities industry.
7 0 Specifically,
the Zerman court reasoned that failure of a broker to disclose that
additional collateral may be required if the value of the securities
drops' 7 ' was information known to anyone involved with securities
transactions and, thus, plaintiff simply failed to state a claim.
7 '
In addition, the Zerman court looked to the plaintiffs' background
in support of the decision.'" The court had difficulty believing plain-




167. Id. This case does not follow the typical rule lOb-16 scenario since the plaintiff did
not fail to meet a margin call and the plaintiff also signed a margin agreement. Id. at 21.
168. Id. at 21. The claim was properly dismissed pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 21. See Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 1980) ("It
is not a violation of any securities law to fail to disclose a result that is obvious even to a
person with only an elementary understanding of the stock market."); Alabama Farm Bureau
Mutual Casualty Co. v. American Fidelity Life Insurance Co., 606 F.2d 602, 611 (5th Cir.
1979) ("The allegation would not . .. state a claim for which relief might be granted if it
contended only that the defendants' failed to reveal the obvious or well known."). The Zerman
court placed a great deal of emphasis upon the Vaughn and American Fidelity decisions in
concluding that the plaintiff should not recover. See Zerman, 735 F.2d at 21. Unfortunately,
neither of the two decisions involved a rule lOb-16 action. Vaughn involved a tender offer
and American Fidelity involved a stock repurchase agreement. See Vaughn, 628 F.2d at 1216-18;
American Fidelity, 606 F.2d at 605-06.
171. This would be a potential violation under rule lOb-16 which states in relevant part:
"and (vii) the nature of any interest or lien retained by the broker or dealer in the security
or other property held as collateral and the conditions under which additional collateral can
be required." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16(a)(1)(vii) (1985).
172. Zerman, 735 F.2d at 21. Thus, the case indicates that notwithstanding the detailed
list of disclosure required under rule 10b-16, some information may be so basic that any customer
will be presumed to know it. See Browning, supra note 7, at 9.
173. Zerman, 735 F.2d at 21.
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days before plaintiff made her purchases, plaintiff's husband filed
suit against another brokerage firm over the liquidation of his margin
account for failure to meet a margin call. 7" No other court has
expressly followed the Zerman rationale of considering the background
and sophistication of the specific plaintiff with regard to a rule lOb-16
cause of action.' 7 This type of analysis, however, is common within
the securities laws, especially in cases involving broker churning.
B. Churning
Churning occurs when a broker, acting in his or her own interests,
engages in excessive trading of an account to generate commissions
without regard to the investment objectives of the customer.' Con-
sidering the anti-fraud goals of section 10(b), the federal courts have
recognized that churning results in a private cause of action under
section 10(b) and-rule lOb-5.' 77 In order to prove that an account
has been churned, the plaintiff must demonstrate three elements, in-
cluding whether the broker exercised control over the account.' To
determine whether a broker exercised the requisite control over a plain-
tiff's account, the lower federal courts have considered a number of
factors, including the level of sophistication of the individual plain-
tiff. '79 As the level of sophistication increases, measured by factors
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Robertson, 749 F.2d 530; Angelastro, 764 F.2d 939.
176. See Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARv. L. REv. 869, 869 (1967). The
SEC has provided a definition of churning which follows:
The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance," as
used in section 15(c) of the act, is hereby defined to include any act of any broker
or dealer designed to effect with or for any customer's account in respect to which
such broker or dealer or his agent or employee is vested with any discretionary power
any transactions of purchase or sale which are excessive in size or frequency in view
of the financial resources and character of such account.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c 1-7(a) (1985).
177. See, e.g., Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 (7th Cir. 1983);
Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 709 F.2d 1413, 1416-17 (lth Cir.
1983); Miley v. Oppenheimer, 637 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 1981); Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs
& Co., Inc., 681 F.2d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1982); Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d
365, 368 n.1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973); Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co.,
430 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1970).
178. The plaintiff must prove that (1) the trading in plaintiff's account was excessive in
light of his investment objectives, (2) the broker in question exercised control over the trading
in the account, and (3) the broker acted with intent to defraud or with willful reckless disregard
for the investor's interests. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 324; Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc.,
619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., Inc., 424 F. Supp.
1021, 1039-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 570 F.2d 38, cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1039 (1978). See generally Note, supra note 176, at 871-79 (discussion of the elements
of a churning cause of action).
179. See, e.g., Miley, 637 F.2d at 325; Zurad v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 757 F.2d
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including length of time plaintiff has dealt with investments, whether
all advice from a broker was followed faithfully, and the profession
of the plaintiff, the ability to recovery declines.' 80
For example, in Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., Inc., 81 plain-
tiff argued that the broker-dealer churned the plaintiff's account by
making excessive trades in order to enhance the broker's commis-
sions. 8 ' In denying the plaintiff recovery, the Follansbee court focused
upon three elements.' 83 First, the court determined plaintiff was an
investor who wanted to realize quick profits resulting from short term
swings of the stock market."' The excessive trading element of a
churning case is not established unless the frequency of the trades
was unrelated to the customer's objectives. 85 Plaintiff's desire to make
a quick profit refuted this allegation.',
Secondly, the court determined that plaintiff clearly prohibited the
defendant from controlling the account.' 87 The court stated the pro-
per question to be addressed in determining control was whether the
customer had sufficient intelligence and understanding to evaluate the
recommendations of the broker independently.'88 Third, the court
found the background of the plaintiff supported the conclusion that
129, 131 (7th Cir. 1985); Weiser v. Shwartz, 286 F. Supp. 389, 390-91 (E.D. La. 1968); Zobrist
v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983) (use of level of sophistication to deter-
mine whether plaintiff justifiably relied on defendant's assertions in a rule lob-5 action). If
the plaintiff client is found to be naive or unsophisticated, the client is more likely to follow
the dealer's recommendations and thus control may be indirectly demonstrated. See Note, supra
note 176, at 872. Courts have not been consistent, however, in determining what is naive or
unsophisticated. See Note, supra note 176, at 872-73. In addition, the analysis in Mihara leading
to the determination whether control has been achieved has since been limited by the court
in Follansbee. See Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 677. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned
against construing Mihara "to mean that the most sophisticated investor is not in control of
his account simply because he follows the recommendations of his broker." Id. See Tiernan
v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 3 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983).
180. See, e.g., Zurad, 757 F.2d at 131 (plaintiff had previous experience within the stock
market and entered into transactions contrary to the advice of the broker, yet recovery allowed);
Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 677 (plaintiff had college degree in economics and taken a course in
accounting, yet recovery denied); Yopp v. Siegal Trading Co., Inc., 770 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th
Cir. 1985) (plaintiff was an experienced, college educated businessman and president of a
multimillion dollar corporation, recovery denied).
181. 681 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1982).
182. Id. at 674-75.
183. Id. at 676-78.
184. Id. at 676.
185. Id.
186. Id. Since the plaintiff in Follansbee wanted to take advantage of short term swings
in the market, heavy trading would be a normal course of action employed by the broker
to accomplish this investment goal. Thus, the plaintiff could not properly allege that the broker
churned the account. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 677. Simply stated, a "customer retains control of his account if he has suffi-
cient financial acumen to determine his own best interests and acquiesces in the broker's manage-
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defendant did not control the account. 18 9 The court held that plain-
tiff had the requisite level of sophistication in financial matters to
deny recovery.' 9 The requisite level of sophistication to deny recovery,
however, turns on the particular facts in a given case and that level
often will not be shown in cases in which the fact situations appear
similar. Ig,
A cause of action based on churning is vastly different from an
action based on disclosure violations under rule lOb-16. 92 Both causes
of action, however, emanate from an implied cause of action under
section 10(b).' 93 Since the Robertson court found rule lOb-16 suffi-
ciently similar to the anti-fraud provision of section 10(b), courts should
look to the level of sophistication of the plaintiff in a rule lOb-16
cause of action. In further support of this proposition, courts have
been willing to look to the level of sophistication of a particular plain-
tiff in other areas of the securities law similar to rule 10b-16, in-
cluding Regulation T and section 7 of the 1934 Act.
C. Regulation T and Section 7
Congress passed section 7 of the 1934 Act' 9 4 in order to prevent
ment. . . ." Id. (citing Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 258-59 (1975)). See Newberger, Loeb
& Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1070 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035, (1978)
("if a customer is fully able to evaluate his broker's advice and agree with the broker's sugges-
tions, the customer retains control of the account."); Tiernan, 719 F.2d at 3 ("Consideration
of the investor's sophistication in securities transactions and independent evaluation about the
handling of his account are at least equally as important.").
189. Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 677.
190. Id. The court took into account plaintiff's degree in economics, enrollment in a course
in accounting, ability to read financial reports, and the fact that plaintiff was a regular reader
of investment advisory literature. Id.
191. See, e.g., Zurad, 751 F.2d at 131-33 (although plaintiff had some prior stock market
experience before opening account at defendant's firm, had a moderate understanding of the
market, and had entered into transactions on her own volition and contrary to the advice of
the broker, the court decided these factors were not sufficient to deny recovery); Hecht, 283
F. Supp. 417, 433 ("although [plaintiff's] experience and competence were such that she knew
her account was being actively traded in both securities and commodities, contrary to her claimed
instructions and her claimed needs and objectives, her comprehension of market operations
and business affairs beyond that were so meagre that she still had to rely upon [the defendant]
concerning whether it was excessive under the circumstances.").
192. Compare supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text with supra notes 176-86 and
accompanying text.
193. Compare Robertson, 749 F.2d at 536 (the private cause of action under § 10(b) may
be implied into rule lOb-16) with Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 676 (churning is a violation of §
10(b) and rule 1Ob-5).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1982). Section 7 provides in pertinent part:
(c) It shall be unlawful for any member of a national securities exchange or any
broker or dealer, directly or indirectly, to extend or maintain credit or arrange for
the extension or maintenance of credit to or for any customer-
(1) on any security (other than an exempted security), in contravention of the rules
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excessive use of credit for the purchase of securities. 19S Subsection
(a) authorized the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
to delineate rules and regulations regarding the amount of credit that
may be extended initially and subsequently maintained on any security
not considered an exempted security. 96 In addition, the Federal Reserve
Board promulgated Regulation T'97 to control the amount of credit
that may be extended by brokers and dealers.' 8 Neither section 7
nor Regulaion T expressly provide for a private cause of action.' 99
The history of implying a private cause of action under section 7
or Regulation T parallels the history of most implied private causes
of action under the securities acts."'0 Most early court decisions, in-
cluding Pearlstein I, implied a private cause of action under section
7.201 Recent decisions, however, including Pearlstein v. Scudder &
and regulations which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall
prescribe under subsections (a) and (b) of this section;
(2) without collateral or on any collateral other than securities, exempt in accordance
with such rules and regulations as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System may prescribe....
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person not subject to subsection (c) to extend
or maintain credit or to arrange for the extension or maintenance of credit for the
purpose of purchasing or carrying any security, in the contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Federal Reserve Board [Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System] shall prescribe to prevent the excessive use of credit for the purchas-
ing or carrying of or trading in securities in circumvention of the other provisions
of this section. Such rules and regulations may impose upon all loans made for the
purpose of purchasing or carrying securities limitations similar to those imposed upon
members, brokers, or dealers by subsection (c) of this section and the rules and regula-
tions thereunder ...
Id.
195. See 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1982); see also Kanouse, The Rise and Fall of the Private
Cause of Action for Violation of Margin Requirements, 98 BANKING L.J. 133, 134 (1981).
196. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1982); see Kanouse, supra note 195, at 134.
197. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-220.130 (1985). In essence:
Regulation T governs the extension of credit by brokers. A purchase transaction car-
ried out for a customer's special cash account complies with Regulation T if there
is sufficient cash in the account at the time of the transaction, or the broker makes
the purchase relying in good faith on tHe customer's agreement promptly to pay in
full and his representation that he intends not to sell the security prior to payment.
In addition, if payment is not made within seven business days after the purchase,
the broker must "cancel or otherwise liquidate the transaction."
Comment, Civil Liability for Margin Violations-The Effect of Section 7(f) and Regulation
X, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 94 (1974).
198. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-220.130 (1985).
199. See Kanouse, supra note 195, at 135.
200. See generally supra notes 24-58 and accompanying text (discussion of implied private
causes of action under the federal statutes).
201. See, e.g., Pearlstein, 429 F.2d at 1140 (private cause of action under § 7 allowed because
private actions by market investors would be a "highly effective means of protecting the economy
as a whole from margin violations by brokers and dealers."); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1360 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 904 (1969) (implied private cause of action under § 7); Remar v. Clayton Securities
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (1949) (implied private cause of action under § 7). See also
Kanouse, supra note 195, at 135-37.
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German"2 (Pearlstein I), have tended to deny a private cause of action
under section 7.203
As with the churning cases, federal courts analyze the level of
sophistication of the plaintiff in an action brought under section 7
or Regulation T.204 Justice Friendly in his dissent in Pearlstein I spoke
of the "innocent lamb. ' 20 The justice stated "it may be proper in
some instances to impose civil liability in furtherance of the subsidiary
purpose of section 7(c), protection of the 'innocent lamb' attracted
to speculation by the possibility of large profits with low capital in-
vestment. ' 20 6 Justice Friendly found that the plaintiff in Pearlstein
I could not have been considered unsophisticated given his experience
as a speculator within the stock market. 20 7
An example of federal court analysis of an implied private cause
of action under Regulation T may be found in Stern v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 208 In Stern, the court first determined
that under the proper constitutional analysis set forth in Cort, a private
cause of action could not be implied under Regulation T.20 9 The court
further reasoned that even if a private cause of action did exist, this
particular plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
202. 527 F.2d 1141 (2nd Cir. 1975).
203. See id. at 1145. The Pearlstein H court stated:
However, the addition of section 7(f) to the Exchange Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §
7g(f), as well as the promulgation by the Federal Reserve Board of Regulation X,
12 C.F.R. § 224 (1975), have now made it unlawful to obtain credit in violation
of the margin requirements. The effect of these developments is to cast doubt on
the continued viability of the rationale of our previous holding.
Id. at 1145 n.3. Although Pearlstein II involved the question of damages under section 7 and
not whether a private cause of action could be implied, the decision nonetheless had a signifi-
cant impact on courts that previously had relied on Pearlstein L See, e.g., Utah State Univ.
of Agric. & Applied Sci. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 170 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 890 (1977) (private cause of action should not be implied under Regulation T since
"Congress imposed the margin requirements to protect the general economy, not to give the
customer a free ride at the expense of the broker."); Palmer v. Thompson & McKinnon
Auchincloss, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 915, 921 (D. Conn. 1977) (section 7 meets Cort test and should
be afforded a private cause of action). With the introduction of section 7(f) to the 1970 Ex-
change Act and the decisions in Cort and Transamerica, the continued viability of a private
cause of action under either section 7 or Regulation T is in doubt. See Kanouse, supra note
195, at 141-46.
204. See, e.g., Altschul v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 591, 594
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (denial of recovery under Regulation T because plaintiff was an experienced
investor with over forty years experience in trading securities).
205. Pearlstein, 429 F.2d at 1148 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 603 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1979).
209. Id. at 1089. In light of Cort, the court decided that Pearlstein I was no longer binding
authority and, therefore, the implication of a private cause of action under Regulation T could
properly be denied. Id.
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granted. 210 The decision was based upon the plaintiff's level of business
sophistication.2 '
The Stern court considered a number of factors in concluding that
plaintiff was too sophisticated to be allowed recovery under Regula-
tion T.2'2 The plaintiff in Stern was a physician with a salary in excess
of $100,000 per year who practiced through a solely owned profes-
sional association. 21 3 In addition, the plaintiff had extensive experience
in trading securities.2 '4 The plaintiff did not rely on the broker for
advice in market operations. 215 Thus, based upon the plaintiff's level
of business sophistication and the fact that the plaintiff was not a
"small, inexperienced" investor, the Stern court determined the plaintiff
failed to qualify as a proper plaintiff.21 6
210. Id. at 1097.
211. Id. at 1093-97. The Court stated that a plaintiff must be a "small, inexperienced"
investor to qualify as a plaintiff under § 7. Id. at 1093. See Comment, Securities Exchange
Act of 1934-Civil Remedies Based Upon Illegal Extension of Credit in Violation of Regula-
tion T, 61 MICH. L. RaV. 940, 954 (1963) ("recovery [in private causes of action under §
7] should be denied to the sophisticated trader on the ground that he [was] an accomplice
in the violation" and because "[d]enying him a remedy would serve as a greater deterrent
to future violations . . . than allowance of relief."). The House Committee's report on § 7
states as follows:
The main purpose of these margin provisions in section 6 is not to increase the
safety of security loans for lenders. Banks and brokers normally require sufficient
collateral to make themselves safe without the help of law. Nor is the main purpose
even protection of the small speculator by making it impossible for him to spread
himself too thinly-although such a result will be achieved as a by-product of the
main purpose.
The main purpose is to give a Government credit agency an effective method of
reducing the aggregate amount of the nation's credit resources which can be directed
by speculation into the stock market and out of other more desirable uses of com-
merce and industry-to prevent a recurrence of the pre-crash situation where funds
which would otherwise have been available at normal interest rates for uses of local
commerce, industry, and agriculture, were drained by far higher rates into security
loans and the New York call market.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934). See Remar v. Clayton Security Corp.,
81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (1949) (additional summary and application of House Report 1383).
The Remar court concluded that although small speculator's protection was only a by-product
of the main purpose of § 7, that by-product was sufficient to allow an implied private cause
of action. Id. 1017.
212. Stern, 603 F.2d at 1093.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1094. The court found of extreme importance the fact that plaintiff's trades
included long and short positions. In addition, the plaintiff had been trading in stock puts
and calls on the option market for a number of years. Id. For an in depth discussion of puts,
calls, long and short positions see J. FPa- cis, supra note 153, at 401-12.
215. Stern, 603 F.2d at 1095.
216. Id. at 1097. As in Zerman, the Stern court refused to allow recovery to the plaintiff
as a matter of law. Compare Stern, 603 F.2d at 1097 (summary judgment in favor of
broker/defendant) with Zerman, 735 F.2d at 21 (complaint properly dismissed pursuant to rule
12(b)(6)). The Stern court recognized that whether a particular plaintiff can qualify as a small,
inexperienced investor or should be regarded as a knowledgeable speculator is normally a fac-
tual question which should not be resolved on motion for summary judgment. See Stern, 603
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An analysis of federal case law demonstrates a willingness by federal
courts to look to the level of plaintiff sophistication before allowing
recovery under various private causes of action implied from securities
regulations." 7 Therefore, in the context of an implied private cause
of action under rule lOb-16, courts should consider plaintiff's level
of sophistication. In addition, since most lower federal courts have
found an implied private cause of action under rule lOb-16 based on
section 10(b), 2'8 and a churning cause of action falls within the ambit
of the anti-fraud provisions of section 10(b), 21 9 to consider the level
of sophistication in one action and not another would be an incon-
sistent application of the law. Since the courts have not set forth clear
guidelines for determining the level of sophistication in securities actions
which would prevent recovery, a framework for making this deter-
mination within the area of rule lOb-16 causes of action would prove
helpful.
A PROPOSAL FOR THE DETERMINATION OF A
PLAINTIFF'S LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION
Plaintiff's level of sophistication should be one of a number of
considerations in determining if recovery should be allowed in a rule
lOb-16 action.220 Unless evidence of plaintiff's level of sophistication
is overwhelming, as was the case in Stern and Zerman, the court should
consider this evidence as a factor in the decision to grant or deny
relief regardless of whether plaintiff has complied with rule lOb-16.22'
The following criteria should be weighed in determining the level of
sophistication of a particular plaintiff: (1) amount of investment ex-
F.2d at 1097. In Stern, however, the record was clear that the plaintiff was a knowledgeable
investor and the district court properly granted summary judgment. Id. The Stern decision
is not the only decision to hold that the question of sophistication may be addressed on motion
for summary judgment. See, e.g., Altschul, 518 F. Supp. at 594 (defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment granted as to the churning violation may be upheld since the defendants have
shown that the plaintiff was a "sophisticated investor who had full knowledge of the speculative
nature of his investments and who failed to object to the course of investment until the gamble
failed.").
217. This willingness stems from the fear that plaintiffs may potentially abuse Securities
Acts for their own aggrandizement. See supra notes 129-49 and accompanying text. Specifical-
ly, the courts have become increasingly aware of the potential "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose"
syndrome. See supra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
220. Other factors to consider include whether the broker-dealer has established procedures
to comply with Rule 1Ob-16 and whether the plaintiff has signed a customer's agreement. See
generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1985).
221. See supra notes 150-219 and accompanying text.
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perience; 222 (2) profession; 223 (3) education;224 (4) specific knowledge
of margin trading; 22 (5) the use of more than one brokerage firm
to trade on margin; 2 6 (6) amount of control exercised by the securities
firm in making margin decisions; 22" and (7) whether the plaintiff in-
itiated the margin trading. 2 1 Many of these criteria have been used
by federal courts in determining levels of sophistication in related
securities statutes. This comment suggests that they may also be applied
to rule lOb-16 causes of action.
No conclusive standard should be adopted to find the requisite level
of sophistication to deny recovery. This comment suggests that the
above factors should be balanced in making the final decision. The
presence of a number of these factors, especially a great degree of
investment experience coupled with previous knowledge of margin
trading, will lead to the inference of sophistication and the possibility
of denial of recovery.
CONCLUSION
This comment has examined the decisions of courts struggling with
the implication of a private cause of action under rule lOb-16. This
examination has led to the conclusion that notwithstanding a recent
trend by the Supreme Court to narrow the implication of private causes
of action under federal statutes, an implied private cause of action
under lOb-16 should withstand Supreme Court review. Furthermore,
scienter should be a requisite element of a rule lOb-16 cause of action.
This comment has also suggested that in conjunction with the goal
of federal courts to prevent abuse of the securities laws by investors,
the level of sophistication of each particular plaintiff should be
222. See, e.g., Zurad, 757 F.2d at 131 (plaintiff who had invested in a number of mutual
funds prior to trading in common stock and options was not considered sophisticated in a
churning cause of action).
223. See, e.g., Yopp, 770 F.2d at 1466 (recovery denied to plaintiff who was a president
of a multi-million dollar corporation in a churning cause of action).
224. See, e.g., Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 677 (plaintiff who had a college degree in economics
and had taken a course in accounting was considered sophisticated and, therefore, was denied
recovery under a churning cause of action).
225. See, e.g., Zerman, 735 F.2d at 21 (plaintiff's past experience in trading on margin
was considered by the court in determining level of sophistication resulting in denial of recovery).
226. See, e.g., id. (sophistication may be shown through the use of more than one brokerage
firm to trade on margin).
227. See, e.g., Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 677 (the amount of control exercised by a broker
is a factor in deciding whether plaintiff is sophisticated enough to deny recovery under a chur-
ning cause of action).
228. This final criterion is aimed toward differentiating between the investor who possesses
many of the other criteria described and the investor with no prior investment experience look-
ing for advice from a broker.
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analyzed before recovery is granted under rule lOb-16. In order to
promote consistency among the federal courts, this comment has pro-
posed a number of factors that should be considered in determining
the requisite level of plaintiff sophistication to support denial of
recovery. This comment strongly urges the federal court system to
employ these factors to prevent possible fraudulent claims by
"unlucky" investors who want to use the margin rules as a "heads-I-
win, tails-you-lose" vehicle to ensure personal financial gain.
Larry A. Cerutti
